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Abstract—This paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a
femtocell operator into a mobile communications market where
a macrocell operator exists. The analysis is conducted using a
game-theory-based model, specifically a three–level multi leader–
follower game, where different solution concepts are applied:
Shapley value, Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium. It
aims to answer the question of which benefit mobile communi-
cation users get from the entry of a femtocell operator into the
market. The equilibrium is assessed from the point of view of
each agent (e.g. profits and utilities), and of the whole (e.g. social
welfare). A case for regulatory intervention is made.
Index Terms—Oligopoly, game theory, wireless communica-
tions, femtocell.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a femtocelloperator into a mobile communications market where a
macrocell operator exists.
The scenario consists of one Macrocell Operator (MO) and
one Femtocell Operator (FO), which compete for the provision
of service to the end users. The FO has the same service
coverage as the MO, and each user can access at every point
in space to both MO and FO services [1]. This overlapping
service coverage may be the case of residential areas, corporate
headquarters, university campuses and hot spots, where there
is a large population of users within a limited geographical
area. The MO is entitled to use a certain spectrum band and
leases an amount b of the band to the FO, keeping for itself
the rest, up to W . The FO pays a price p m.u. (monetary
units) per unit of spectrum. The MO leases spectrum to the
FO, which can use it more efficiently, in order to increase its
revenue. Finally, a user would pay p1 m.u. if she subscribed
to MO service, or p2 m.u. if she subscribed to FO service.
All three prices (p, p1 and p2) are referring to the same time
period.
As regards the femtocell deployment, the following assump-
tions are made [2]. First, the femto base stations (femto-
BSs) are deployed by the FO and no capital nor operational
expenses are levied onto the users. The MO is not involved
in the femto-BS deployment, either. Second, the femto-BSs
operate in open-access mode, as this mode allows the FO
to offer service to users. And third, an orthogonal spectrum
assignment is performed through MO-FO coordination, so that
cross-tier interference is completely eliminated.
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As regards the economic interaction, we assume that the
operators compete a` la Bertrand, that is, playing a one-shot
simultaneous game where MO and FO strategies are p1 and p2,
respectively. Both the price p and the leased spectrum amount
b are partially the result of a bargaining process between the
MO and the FO. Finally, each user subscribes to the service
providing the highest utility. The subscription period matches
the time period of the bargain price p and the service prices
p1 and p2.
There have been recent works on economic modeling of
femtocell service provision. Reference [3] covers a similar
setting as our work, since it analyzes the spectrum leasing
between a macrocell service provider and a femtocell service
provider. It is concerned not only with the amount of spectrum
which is leased, but also with the amount of leased spectrum
that the femtocell service provider is willing to share with the
users of the macrocell service provider. However, it builds
a non-standard model according to microeconomics, since
it does not incorporate the users demand into the model,
which we indeed do; instead, it inserts a proxy for the users
utility in the service providers utility. Reference [4] models
a scenario where one macrocell operator leases spectrum to
one femtocell operator, and it derives the conditions under
which the former has incentives to lease. It assumes, as in our
work, that the femtocell operator provides the same coverage
as the macrocell operator. However, it assumes that the leasing
(wholesale) price and the service (retail) price are the same
and it bases the assumption on the need to avoid arbitrage. We
do not base our model on this assumption; on the contrary, we
model the leasing price and the subscription price as different
and independent variables.
Spectrum leasing has been part of several proposals aimed
at enhancing the efficiency of the spectrum exploitation by
providing flexibility to users and operators, e.g., reference [5]
analyzes primary spectrum leasing in exchange for secondary
user cooperation.
This paper aims to answer the following question: which
benefit do mobile communication users get from the entry of
a femtocell operator into the market? The main contribution
of the paper is two-fold. Firstly, it models a scenario where
there is an incumbent operator and where an entry decision
should be made by an entrant operator; this scenario is more
realistic that static duopoly scenarios frequently presented in
the literature. And secondly, it incorporates a bargaining before
the competition takes place, which is not common in the
literature.
Our analysis may also be applied in a wider context where a
new technology—providing greater efficiency than the current
2one—is introduced by an entrant. However, for the sake of
conciseness we have focused on a femtocell scenario.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the
game–theory–based model for the scenario is described and
the equilibrium concepts that we apply are presented and de-
rived. The analysis and the results are presented and discussed
in section III, and conclusions are drawn in Section IV.
II. MODEL
The strategic interaction between the two operators and the
n users is modeled as a three-level multi leader-follower game
that we analyze through backward induction.
A. Subscription game—third phase
In this phase, a pair of values b and p has been agreed and
the prices p1 and p2 have been announced.
The utility that the users receive from each operator depends
on two factors:
Quality of service: Each operator exploits, during each
subscription period, an amount of spectrum which is agreed
at the end of the first phase: W2 = b for the FO and
W1 = W − b for the MO. Channel conditions from the
different locations within a macrocell are detrimental to the
data rate that the users of the macrocell service obtain from a
given amount of bandwidth. We model this fact by a macrocell
spectrum efficiency θ. On the other hand, since femto-BSs are
deployed indoors and are very close to the users’ phones, we
assume that all users of the femtocell service have equal good
channel conditions and achieve the same maximum spectrum
efficiency. Then the transfer rate that is offered to each user
is θiWi/ni [6], where ni is the number of subscribers of
operator i. We propose to use this transfer rate as the main
quality factor which contributes to the user utility. Specifically,
Qi = log (1 + θiWi/ni), where θ2 = 1 for the FO, and
θ1 < θ2 for the MO. There is an increasing evidence that
user experience and satisfaction in mobile broadband scenarios
follow logarithmic laws [7].
Price: the higher the subscription price, the lower the user
utility.
Based on the above discussion, we propose a quasi-linear
expression for the user utility. Specifically, for operator i’s
users, it is Ui = Qi − pi. Each user will subscribe to the
operator providing the service with the higher utility. Assum-
ing that the number of users is high enough, the individual
subscription decision of each individual user will not affect
the utility received by the rest. Then, the equilibrium notion is
the Wardrop equilibrium [8]. We assume that the users who do
not subscribe have a utility equal to 0. Applying the Wardrop
equilibrium concept, we may state the following:
If some users decide not to subscribe to either the MO or the
FO, then U1 = U2 = 0 (i.e., the users are indifferent between
subscribing or not). Given the expression for the utility, it can
be shown that this scenario cannot occur in the equilibrium [9].
Alternatively, if every user subscribes to either the MO or
the FO then Ui ≥ 0. Here, the case U1 > U2 (respectively,
U2 > U1) where no user subscribes to the FO (MO) cannot
be an equilibrium, apart from the trivial case b = 0 (b = W ).
Therefore, in the next sections, we will restrict to the case
where all users distribute between the MO and the FO (i.e.,
U1 = U2 ≥ 0).
B. Price competition game—second phase
In this phase, a pair of values b and p has been agreed
on, and each operator chooses its price so as to maximize its
profits. The outcome of the subscription game is assumed to
be anticipated by both operators, and taken into account in the
pricing decisions.
The profits of the MO and the FO can be expressed, respec-
tively, as Π1 = n1 ·p1+p ·b−C1 and Π2 = n2 ·p2−p ·b−C2,
where Ci is the cost born by Operator i
When solving the equilibrium equations for the second and
the third phase, n1 and n2 may be expressed as functions of
p1 and p2, so that operator profits are functions of p1 and p2
only: Π1 = Π1(p1, p2), Π2 = Π2(p1, p2).
Now, turning our attention to the pricing game, the equi-
librium strategies p∗1 and p∗2 are given by the Nash equi-
librium conditions [10]: Π1(p∗1, p∗2) ≥ Π1(p1, p∗2), ∀p1;
Π2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) ≥ Π2(p∗1, p2), ∀p2; meaning that no operator can
unilaterally increase its profits by a price change.
These equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a pair of
optimization problems i = 1, 2{
max
α,pi
fi(α, pi) = αpi
subject to gi(α, pi) = U1 − U2 = 0, hi(α, pi) = Ui ≥ 0
Note that we have introduced α as an auxiliary optimization
variable. It is defined as α  n1/n, and it denotes the fraction
of users subscribing to the MO.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the two
optimization problems (i = 1, 2) are
∇fi + λi∇gi + μi∇hi = 0 (1)
gi = 0;μihi = 0;μi ≥ 0;hi ≥ 0. (2)
We distinguish between two cases. If U1 = U2 > 0, then
the inequality constraints are not active. Under the assumption
that the partial derivatives of Π1 and of Π2 with respect to p1
and p2 exist, the following equation is obtained for α [9]:
f(α, r1, r2) = f(1− α, r2, r1), (3)
where f(x, a, b) = log
(
1 + ax
)−α( 1x2/a+x + 1(1−x)2/b+1−x)
and ri = θiWi/n, i = 1, 2.
It can be easily shown that there exists a unique value α∗ ∈
(0, 1) which satisfies (3) [9]. The prices p∗1 and p∗2 are obtained
from α∗ by recalling that U1 = U2.
Else, if U1 = 0 or U2 = 0, the following reasoning applies.
Let α1 and α2 be, respectively, the only solutions in (0, 1) of
f(α, r1, r2) = 0 and f(1−α, r2, r1) = 0. If U1 = 0, from (1)–
(2) we obtain the condition C1: f(α, r1, r2) ≤ 0, which holds
if, and only if, α ≥ α1. Likewise, if U2 = 0 we obtain the
condition C2: f(1 − α, r2, r1) ≤ 0, which holds if, and only
if, α ≤ α2. The detailed derivation of the expressions may be
found in [9].
Depending on the relative position of α1 and α2 we have
one of the following three situations: i) If α1 > α2, it is not
3possible to meet C1 and C2 simultaneously. Hence, an equi-
librium such that U1 = U2 = 0 does not exist. Furthermore,
the solution to (3) α∗ ∈ (α2, α1) yields U1 = U2 > 0. ii) If
α1 < α2, any α ∈ (α1, α2) satisfies C1 and C2; there exists
an infinite and non-denumerable set of equilibrium points, and
the analysis fails to predict an outcome [11]. iii) If α1 = α2,
then α∗ = α1 = α2 is both the only solution to (3) and the
only value that satisfies C1 and C2 simultaneously.
C. Operators bargaining—first phase
As stated at the beginning of this section, the price p and
the amount of spectrum b are subject to a bargaining process
between the MO and the FO, which is conducted before the
subscription prices are advertised by the operators and the
subscription decision is made by the users.
We model the bargaining as a non-cooperative game where
the incumbent operator (the MO) has full bargaining power
and therefore offers a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the entrant
operator (the FO) [12]. For the sake of simplicity, we stand
by the full bargaining power case, although alternative assump-
tions are possible, as discussed later.
The game is analyzed as a dynamic game in an extensive
form. Following backward induction, depending on the values
of (b, p) which characterize the MO offer, the bargaining
outcome is as follows: 1) The MO will make an offer only if it
prefers the competition outcome compared to the monopolistic
outcome, that is, Π1 ≥ Πm. 2) If the offer made by the MO
induces Π2 ≥ 0, the FO will accept the offer. Otherwise,
Π2 < 0, and the FO will refuse it.
To compute Πm, the problem should be stated as an optimal
decision problem, such that the optimal price p∗m should fulfill
Πm(p
∗
m) ≥ Πm(pm), ∀pm.
From the condition Π2 ≥ 0 it follows that p ≤ U(b) 
nb−1 ((1− α)p2 − C2/n), and from the condition Π1 ≥ Πm,
we get p ≥ L(b)  nb−1 (log(1 + θ1W/n)− αp1). Again,
the detailed derivation of the expressions may be found in [9].
Therefore, a non-empty feasibility region (FR) will exist if
L(b) ≤ U(b) and a point (b, p) will be in the FR iff
max
(
0, L(b)
) ≤ p ≤ U(b). Our numerical experiments —
not shown here due to the lack of space— revealed that for
each configuration there exists a threshold value bfmin such
that L(b) ≤ U(b) if b ≥ bfmin. In other words, for values of b
greater than a bfmin, corresponding values for p can be found
such that competition results in an equilibrium.
The final bargaining outcome will depend on the specific
assumptions made. If the incumbent has full bargaining power,
it will ask for a profit-maximizing price p —i.e. such that the
p = U(b). Given that Π1 is monotonically increasing on p,
this would provide the incumbent with maximum profits.
Nevertheless, other solution concepts can be borrowed from
the cooperative game theory for choosing the value of p. We
can transform the problem of setting the price p at which
the MO sells bandwidth to the FO, to an equivalent one of
deciding how the extra profit Δ is shared between the MO and
the FO. For this equivalent problem, the Shapley value [10]
provides a fair allocation of the payoff obtained by the MO–
FO coalition, such that each operator (MO or FO) will receive
a share of the profits proportional to its contribution to the
total profits. In our case, the Shapley value allocation yields
Π1 =
1
2Πm+
1
2 (Πm+Δ−0) = Πm+ Δ2 , Π2 = 120+ 12 (Πm+
Δ−Πm) = Δ2 which correspond to p = (U(b) + L(b))/2.
Alternatively, the problem of agreeing a value for p can
be casted into a two person bargaining problem in which the
disagreement point is (Πm, 0) and the players’ strategies are
their offers about p. In this setting, both the Nash bargaining
solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution [10]
can be computed; it can be shown that both yield the same
results as the provided by the Shapley value.
Note, however, that the value b is not determined by the
bargaining, but only constrained by L(b) ≤ U(b). As shown
in the next section, welfare can determine the value b.
III. RESULTS AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the different competitive equilibria, we
propose to use the following indicators: operators profits Π1
and Π2; user utilities, U1 = U2; and social welfare, SW ,
computed as the sum of the users utilities and the operators
profits SW = n1 ·U1+n2 ·U2+Π1+Π2. We have conducted
a series of numerical experiments in order to obtain a better
understanding of the scenario from the point of view of the
economic interactions. The values for the parameters are:
n = 10000 users; W = 100 kHz; C1 = 20 m.u; C2 = 10 m.u.;
θ1 = 0.5 bit/s/Hz; θ2 = 1 bit/s/Hz. The values do not
match any specific real scenario. In order to do so, appropriate
coefficients must be inserted in the model equations.
A. On the value of the leased spectrum
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the effect of
varying the amount of leased spectrum b. We assumed that p
is agreed so that the Shapley values result for the profits. The
following values are simultaneously represented as functions
of b on Fig. 1: α, U1 and U2, Π1 and Π2, and SW; the left
axis is for α and Ui, and the right one is for Πi and SW. For
the values b such that multiple equilibria would result, i.e.,
b /∈ [bumin, bumax], no value is represented. For the values of
b such that (b, p) does not yield competitive equilibrium, i.e.,
b < bfmin, results for the MO correspond to the monopoly
scenario.
We see that, with respect to the number of subscribers,
throughout the interval b < bfmin, the MO remains as the
monopolistic operator, i.e. α = 1 holds. When b ≥ bfmin, the
FO enters the market, and α decreases as b increases.
With respect to profits Π1 and Π2, both operators increase
their respective profits when the FO enters the market. Fur-
thermore, they keep increasing as the FO gets more spectrum
for providing service to its users. The FO’s higher efficiency
and the increasing payment to the MO explains this behavior.
With respect to utilities U1 and U2, the range of values
b ∈ [bumin, bumax], where a unique equilibrium results, corre-
sponds to positive values of U1 = U2, as stated in section II-B.
The entry of FO is beneficial for the users, as the utility
increases as b increases up to bUW ≈ 0.5W . From this value,
the utility decreases down to zero. We may conclude from this
behavior that a symmetric equilibrium, where the FO and the
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MO have a similar amount of spectrum, precludes them from
exercising any kind of market power. In other words, the level
of competition is maximum and the users derive the maximum
utility from the service.
With respect to the social welfare SW , a maximum is
reached for a value bSW , which is greater than bUW . Bearing
in mind that the social welfare adds up the users utility and
the operators profits, this maximum is a trade off between the
maximum utility reached at bUW and the increasing profits.
In this experiment, the value p that is agreed provides the
Shapley values for the profits. For any other value of p, specif-
ically for p = U(b) —i.e., the incumbent has full bargaining
power—the profits Π1 and Π2 would obviously be different.
Nevertheless, the aggregate profits and the equilibrium prices
would remain the same as above, and consequently the user
utility, and the social welfare.
B. Welfare-maximizing values for the leased spectrum
We proceed to evaluate the optimum values b of leased
spectrum from the point of view of the welfare. Specifically we
have computed and represented the following values in Fig. 2:
maximum (minimum) value of b/W in the FR which results in
a unique competitive equilibrium (bmax/W [bmin/W ]); and
value of b/W between bmin/W and bmax/W such that users
utility (social welfare) is maximized (bUW /W [bSW/W ]). We
have performed different experiments varying W , which is
represented in the x-axis relative to the number of users n.
We see that the value bmax/W tends to the value 1, which
is the case where the whole spectrum W is leased to the
FO and the profits are maximized. The constraint is put by
the uniqueness of the equilibrium, b < bumax. As regards
bmin/W , there is a lower range of values of W where the
uniqueness criteria constraints the possibility of a competitive
equilibrium, bmin = bumin > b
f
min, and a higher range of
values of W where the bargaining constraints the possibility,
bmin = b
f
min > b
u
min. Finally, bUW is lower than bSW , as
expected, but eventually bmin increases and precludes any
interior maximum for bUW and bSW to occur.
The above results mean that the degenerate case b/W ≈ 1,
which would be the optimum from the point of view of the
operators, is not always the optimum from the point of view
of either users utility or social welfare. We would argue then
that a regulator would have strong arguments —i.e., welfare
enhancement—to set a maximum value b/W < 1 of leased
spectrum. And our argument is independent on the procedure
that implements the bargaining on p.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
From our analysis and results we can conclude that every
actor, that is, the users and the two operators, are better off
when the FO enters the market. This entry (and the competitive
equilibrium that results) requires that the bargain outcome lies
inside the feasibility region and the uniqueness region, both
of which have been characterized. Furthermore, the regulator
intervention is deemed necessary in order to restrain the
incumbent operator from leasing the whole amount of the
spectrum to the entrant operator, which will harm the users.
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